The current Japanese economy has continued to grow, albeit at a low rate, through the drastic changes in the Japanese economic system. The global crisis has seriously affected the Japanese economy, despite it causing only slight damage to the banking sector. The current global economic crisis will have far-reaching consequences on the economic system and structure. In this study, the economic characteristics following the bubble economy and the sustainability of the Japanese economic system are examined.
Introduction
The bubble economy and the period immediately following it have drastically changed the Japanese economy and economic system. Globalisation-featuring neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism-did not allow the traditional Japanese economic system to remain intact. In fact, in the 1990s and 2000s, the managements of Japanese companies and the economic system formed as a result of theses companies was criticized as representing 'crony capitalism', and the business society sought liberal and shareholder-oriented reforms. There has always been a traditional rivalry between those who support stakeholder capitalism; however, with the emergence of developing financial markets and the merger and acquisition (M&A) boom, there is a greater importance being placed on the US type shareholder sovereignty. A series of corporate laws have been deregulated and liberalised in the entire sphere of the Japanese economy.
The liberalisation process, however, cannot be simplified. Liberalisation has been accompanied by a number of corporate scandals, and liberal reforms have not been very successful. M&As and corporate governance controversies have revealed contradictions inherent in the reforms.
Firstly, although the original US model is often identified as a shareholder sovereignty model, there are some state-level jurisdictions that promote stakeholders and regulation. The real authority of managements in US firms is larger than it outwardly appears. Further, considering the difficult experiences of former socialist economies during market transition, a transplantation of the US model appears to yield unsuitable results (Iwai and Sato, 2008; Uemura and Kaneko, 2007) . At the very least, in the 2000s, market fundamentalism seems to have become the basic ideology for reform.
The social outcome resulting from reforms and the global crisis have rapidly changed Japan's economic situation. Market fundamentalism is criticised and the quality of the market is taken very seriously. Laissez-faire economics does not automatically improve the quality of the market.
Although securitisation based on financial engineering has made large-scale financing possible, it has also brought unreasonable risk upon investors; furthermore, moral hazards, high leverage, and the mismanagement of risk (i.e., a 'reckless market') simultaneously drove the global economy to crisis. The failure of hedge funds in 1998, immediately following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, did not provide adequate lessons for evading the crisis. The 21 st century financial crisis seems to be continuously functioning, and it may well arouse suspicion regarding the efficiency of both the US economic system and the ideology that underpins it.
This paper focuses on the Japanese economy following the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, providing a general overview of the impact of the global crisis on Japan. Compared to the US model, Japan's experience characterises different aspects of the global crisis. At the same time,
Japan's experiences in the 1990s and 2000s and the crisis itself highlight changes that have occurred in the Japanese economic system. There are a variety of capitalism-driven approaches worldwide, and while the Japanese system can be considered a key capitalist model, changes have brought about a shift in perspective regarding capitalist policies.
Japanese economy after the 'lost 10 years'
Japan's so-called 'lost 10 years' occurred in the 1990s, after the collapse of the bubble economy;
during this decade, a long-term recession hit Japan and the country was unable to recover (Table 1) .
A sharp decline in asset prices in the 1990s brought about a reactionary fall, which was the opposite of jump in the prices of assets such as land and stock in the second half of the 1980s. It is inevitable that a steep rise in asset values will have a deep effect on the real economy; indeed, Japan's 'lost 10 years' showed a sharp contrast, in terms of economic performance (Table 2) , to previous decades.
On one hand, this reactionary fall is a product of the so-called bubble economy. The following two financial problems were especially serious, following the collapse of the bubble economy.
Japan's public finances showed a surplus until 1992, and the accumulated financial deficits represented about 65% of Japan's GDP. However, due to a decline in tax revenues following the collapse of the bubble economy and an increase in the public expenditures needed for recovery, public finances worsened after 1993; accumulated deficits represented 95% of GDP in 1996. Tax revenues have been declining since 1990-in that year, ¥60 trillion was collected and even in 2009, tax revenues remained low (¥46 trillion). State expenditures, however, have continued to increase, especially in the forms of social security and state bond payments; they have reached ¥102 trillion.
The government has been unable to improve the balance between revenues and expenditures, and accumulated deficits reached more than 170% of GDP in 2008. Around ¥30 trillion of government-issued state bonds were in circulation at the end of 1990s, but that number exceeded ¥40 trillion in 2009. Therefore, the interest rate carries the potential risk of inflicting a national budget collapse.
The second financial problem was bad loans 2 . Land and stock prices-commodities that financial organisations considered the targets of financing-showed sharp declines. Because many banks held bad loans, some banks faced bankruptcy; 180 banks failed during 1993-2002. Nonbank financial institutions that were not as tightly regulated as financial institutions played a serious role in the bad-loan debacle 3 . The nonbank institution Housing Finance Corporation went bankrupt in 1996; the Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Security went bankrupt in 1997, and the debts of the latter reached ¥3 trillion. Details regarding bankrupt banks are listed in Table 3 . Change of ratio to nominal GDP +2.8 times -2.0 times Table 3 Number of bankrupt banks   year  1991-1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002-2005   number  36  30  44  14  56  1 Source: Fujii, 2009, p.238. Under such conditions, the Japanese government decided to introduce a law concerning capital injection into the banking sector 4 . At the same time, the government itself nationalised some banks:
the Japan Long-term Credit Bank and Japan Bond Credit Bank, in 1998, and in 2003, the Ashikaga Bank was temporarily nationalised. As a result, more than 15 years had passed (March 2005) before the government had announced the settlement of bad loans and that financial organisations had been paid ¥96 trillion in full (Fujii, 2009, p. 215 ).
On the other hand, the traditional Japanese economic system itself has been considered a negative factor in bringing about economic recovery; the crisis revealed its inefficiencies and lack of transparency. Under conditions of globalisation and flourishing neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism, the Japanese model has been criticised and obliged to adapt itself, so as to be more greatly aligned with the Anglo-Saxon model. The moral hazards of financial institutions-which gave rise to bad loans-were criticised as a product of the Japanese management system, and the Japanese financial administration (i.e., the convey system) bore the full brunt of public criticism. The deregulation and privatisation policy of the Koizumi government is considered a result of these trends.
Just after 2002, Japan was showing signs of emerging from the long-term crisis (Ito, 2007) .
Increases in corporate profits and equipment investments led the growth, and demand-supply gaps were also disappearing. The labour supply had improved, although most employees held irregular hours or were seasonal. Stock prices increased and the settlement of bad loans relaxed deflationary pressures. The central bank cancelled both the 'quantitative deregulation policy' and the so-called 'zero interest policy'. Japan's Cabinet Office (Economy and Finance) suggested a positive trend for [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] ; indeed, the country has achieved a stable recovery base in the corporate, household and external sectors. The recovery of the corporate sector has spread to households, and consumption has shown positive trends (Cabinet Office, 2006) .
Private firms continued to perform positively, showing increases in profits, due to deflation and restructuring; increases in manufacturing profits; the repayment of loans; and the completion of stock adjustments, among other signs. In addition, worldwide economic growth led to recovery in the Japanese economy, and export contributions to economic growth became high. As a result, Japan enjoyed its longest-lasting post-WWII boom.
While the corporate sector drastically enlarged its net profits, only three branches (electric machinery, automobiles, and business companies) occupied 52% of the total profits; five branches 4 The government injected ¥12.4 trillion, of which 74% was returned; ¥3.2 trillion remained unreturned as of 2008.
(the above three, plus machinery and steel) comprised two-thirds (2 April 2009, Nihonkeizai newspaper) . External demand evidently became the main source of growth, suggesting the fragility of the circumstances that led to the global crisis 5 . The most recent boom is obviously different from the others (Table 4) ; it is long-lasting, but weak 6 . Inasmuch as wages indicate the opposite trend (i.e., a decrease), consumption (domestic demand) cannot contribute to growth. In order to derive profits, firms seem to have increased restructuring, drastically reducing their employment rolls; however, labour productivity did not increase proportionately. The figures in Table 5 suggest that manufacturing enjoyed high growth due to the bubble of the US economy and resource-exporting countries, as well as a low yen-conversion rate, and that nonmanufacturing sectors continued to see low growth. Indeed, growth potential was fragile, following the 'lost 10 years'. 
The global crisis in Japan
The global crisis is backed by a surplus of money supply in developed countries; various kinds of bonds, such as subprime loans, can be considered catalysts of absorption. Not only oil dollars but also cheap money has run rampant worldwide, and both are amplified by leverage. In fact,
'following a collapse of housing bubble in USA, bubble of resource price and bubble of emerging markets happen, and there exists a relay of the global bubbles' (Kohno, 2009, p. 24) .
The epicentre of the global financial crisis was the US economy, with there being three 'ripple paths' of crisis (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2009) 
1) The credit expansion type (in the US, UK, Spain, Ireland and other countries). Domestic consumption decreased drastically, owing to a collapse of the housing bubble and general disorder in the financial system.
2) The export lead type (in Japan, Germany, South Korea, Singapore and other countries).
Exports declined, due to a sharp downturn of demand among developed countries.
3) The emerging market type (in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania and other countries).
External fund inflows disappeared, due to recession in the donor countries. Export declines have brought about a shock in export-oriented regions (e.g., Toyota City), and regional differences vis-à-vis the economic crisis can be observed.
Recently, economic performance has created a negative chain reaction. A decline in production has aggravated employment and consumption circumstances which, in turn, have resulted in production downturns. Investments have also decreased. Given that the export industry makes use of wide-ranging subcontractors, it can incur enormous damage upon the economy; while it is natural for the number of irregularly employed workers to increase in periods of low economic growth, 
Is the recent recovery real?
After April Japan shows signs of great economic recovery, following deep declines. As Table 6 indicates, not only exports but also domestic demand seem to have improved. Stock prices have gone up and returned to pre-crisis levels; also, hedge funds have repurchased stocks. However, government measures may be considered temporary, and the sustainable recovery of businesses after 2010 is open to question (28 May 2009, Nihonkeizai newspaper) . The Japanese government anticipates negative performance in both the labour market and incomes, which means a continuous deterioration of purchasing power among Japanese households (Nagahama, 2009, p. 31) . Recovery has been accompanied by a sharp compression of firm costs, including th personnel-e.g., ¥850 billion by Toyota, ¥800 billion by Sony, and ¥500 billion by Hitachi and others-which has been undertaken to increase global competitiveness. A cost cut, however, involves both a demand reduction and a wage cut, both of which may become barriers to economic recovery. Thus, the present-day economic recovery may well be understood as being temporary, and so firms are hesitant to invest in equipment. In addition, the deflation spiral maintains a vicious circle: constraints in income and investment payments (e.g., wage decreases), made in the name of survival and price competition-i.e., reductions in employment and consumption, and unrest regarding social safety nets, due to budget constraints-result in production downturns. This vicious circle looks very much like the deflation spiral seen in the early 2000s 12 .
In short, inasmuch as China and government procurement have catalysts, commercial banks continue to be inactive as intermediates, the Japanese government's stance appears unclear, and the US household sector cannot be adjusted in the short term, the present-day economic recovery must be regarded with caution (28 May 2009, Nihonkeizai newspaper) . In short, it is too early for 'the false dawn' to have broken.
Although recovery is yet ongoing, in the long run, Japan holds som growth, including an aging society, a declining population (i.e., labour force) and a fragile budget. To estimate the sustainability of Japan's economic recovery, the following provides a general survey of Generally speaking, the traditional corporate system in Japan is characterised as follow Japanese enterprises undertake cross-shareholding and stable shareholding based on related companies and the main banks, long-term transaction relations within the group, and specific subcontracting relations (Keiretsu). Enterprises are closely related to the main banks; thus, Japanese companies are said to attach general importance to market share and long-term management 15 , and the Japanese system may be regarded as a stakeholder type. According to Jackson and Miyajima (2007) , Th management practices geared to mobilise long-term commitment to the enterprise. Lifetime employment is a norm for regular and usually male employees in large firms, which became institutionalised in tandem with the emergence of cooperative enterprise-based unions in the early post-war period. While lifetime employment reflects strong legal constraints on dismissals, firms also invest in firm-specific skills and maintain internal flexibility of employees with regard to job functions within the firm or related firms. This system is supported by seniority-related wages, a rank-hierarchy system of promotion, training through job rotation, and a strong socialisation into company culture. (p. 4-5) ditional Japanese model (hereafter termed a 'J firm') experienced drastic cha collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s.
The J firm began to change in the turning-po nsified and changes are based on corporate ownership. Figure 1 indicates the distribution percentage of unit shares, held by types of shareholders in listed companies. 13 The various capitalism-based approaches classify corporate systems by virtue of these aspects. See Hall and Soskice, 2001. 14 'Managers' refers to top managers-i.e., various kinds of directors and executive committee members-and Japanese companies draw sharp lines between managers and employees. Therefore, in the strict sense of the term, the upper management class (the top-rank employees) not holding a position of a director or an executive is excluded from managers. Nonetheless, the line between the two is not clear; in Russian firms, for example, a chief information executive is considered a middle manager. Regarding the various definitions of 'manager', see Osawa (2004) and Roschin and Solntsev (2006 Yamanouchi Pharmacy, Tokyo Electron, Furukawa Electrics, TDK, ORIX and Murata, among others (Kagono, 2005, p. 298) . Companies with a high share of foreign shareholders tend to align corporate governance structure with that of a market-oriented, US type of structure. While cross-shareholding has been declining, that decline has seen a recent reversal.
many companies have resumed cross-shareholding, to prevent M&As from occurring. Two trends, therefore, have been observed: a decline in Japanese insiders' share, and a recovery thereof. Some firms that continued borrowing had maintained cross-shareholding; to preclude M&As and increase international competitiveness, many large businesses tried to form stable shareholding. For example, New Japan Steel, Sumitomo Steel and Kobe Steel each holds mutual shares. As a result, the process has resulted in a growing diversity of ownership patterns among the enterprises involved.
Government committee criticism of cross-shareholding is strong (11 June 2009, Nihonkeizai newspaper).
J firms ha core role of providing financing. Corporate finance, however, drastically changed following financial deregulations and the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s.
Internal funds comprise a principle component of financing; external funds, ncial path, have declined in terms of share percentage. These changes, however, should not be overstated. While large firms reduced their links with banks and began financing through bonds, smaller firms continued borrowing from banks; in short, some large, listed firms depend upon capital markets, while smaller firms continue to rely upon bank borrowing. Corporate finance in Japan can therefore be characterised by segmented main banks and the coexistence of dual bank-firm relations (Jackson and Arikawa and .
The financial crisis wrought great changes to the Japanese eco reased to 34.9% by the end of 2008; equity financing declined and shares of cross-shareholding were also negatively influenced. Moreover, long-term borrowing increased. These changes, however, cannot be considered critical. 22 The introduction of global accounting standards has also reduced cross-shareholding. 23 The big banks reduced their shareholding from around ¥30 trillion in 2001 to about ¥10 trillion in March 2009 (Bank of Japan, 2009 . 24 The peak of cross-shareholding was in 1987, because the selling of crossholding shares incurred corporate restructuring costs. he-job training (OJT) has play 99) regards the degree of skill formation as a basic 'competitive edge' of a company; he believes that intellectual skills determine production efficiency and that such skills became generalised as well as firm-specific 26 . As it is difficult for Japanese firms to adjust employment (i.e., perform restructuring) under lifetime-employment conditions, core workers employed by J firms are protected in a manner similar to that seen in European continental countries (Table 7) . Inasmuch as lifetime employment involves core workers, lifetime employment gives expression to the employment ratio by age. For male workers, the employment ratio is relatively high until retirement age; for female workers, however, a plotting of employment ratio indicates a relative low employment rate and an M-shaped line (i.e., a decline of employment rate in the 30-40-year age bracket). J-firm institutions showed stable complementarities; according to Tsuru (2005) , J firms use a competence-qualification system 27 .
Fluctuations in the labour
Institutions have mutual compleme tem; wages correlate with the length of employment, and the seniority system can be considered a 'generation wage transfer' from young workers to more senior ones. Labour share (i.e., personnel expenditure divided by the total value added) increased with economic growth (Figure 3 ).
Furthermore, labour share has been decreasing in the 2000s and the wages of the senior generation 25 Such 'competitive edges' include knowledge about the market, the availability of different kinds of highly skilled workers, labour management and other factors (Whitley, 2007, p. 89) . 26 Miyamoto (2004) regards skills formed within a firm, irrespective of education level, as intermediate skills; that study also differentiates the Japanese type from the US type, according to degree of intermediate skills. 27 The fundamental frameworks are as follows: human resource accumulation by firm-specific skills, transactions based on relation-specific skills and job experiences, and the growth of a firm.
are decreasing (Morita, 2009) . However, Japanese corporations have maintained a relative high labour share. The correlation between wages and job evaluations has been strengthened, while the length of employment and the grade system continue to influence wages (Tsuru, Abe and Kubo, 2005 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 ％ Source: Ministry of Finance (19 August 2009.http://www.mof.go.jp) he Japanese labour system is not easily sustained, especially in the face of intense international com T petition. When the average worker is young, the system is more easily sustained; however, now that Japanese society is generally aging, labour costs are high compared to labour input. The competence-qualification system has therefore been replaced by a merit-pay system. To decrease labour costs, some firms have sought to abolish lifetime employment and reduce wages; this has resulted in employees changing jobs, and so it has become more difficult to maintain any acquisition of firm-specific skills in the long term.
Changes to employment laws have promoted the hiring of more irregularly employed workers wh ample, the Toyota automobile company utilised a temporary-help agency. Tables 8 and 9 show a drastic increase in irregularly employed workers. Although female workers have traditionally comprised a high proportion of irregularly employed workers, there has also been an increase among male workers. In terms of irregularly employed workers, from the vantage of age structure, as companies froze the hiring of regularly employed workers in the 1990s, the younger and older generations have each comprised a relatively high proportion of all workers. Table 10 outlines the various types of irregularly employed workers.
For ex omobile factory in the Kyushu area uses more than 2,000 temporary workers, who occupied about 40% of that firm's manufacturing sector there. Although the Toyota system has firm-specific technology and skills that can be easily passed down by workers and over generations, the employment of flexible, temporary workers has become indispensable for corporate survival. No two automobile companies employ the same type of irregularly employed workers; while Toyota chooses to employ workers for a temporary but defined period and controls them in the same way as it would its regular employees, for example, Nissan prefers to employ outside contract workers and does not control them directly (Ihara, 2009 ).
An increase in irregular employ employment status means that there has been a reduction of value among firm-specific skills, and that J firms have generally foregone long-term employment. In addition, the institutional complementarities between bank finance and in-house training that previously characterised the traditional Japanese firm do not seem to function under present-day circumstances; instead, there has been a shift from bank finance to equity finance (shareholder activism), which may threaten the Japanese style of human resource management (Abe and Hoshi, 2007) . At the same time, as Jackson and Miyajima (2007) point out, 'most firms have adopted me sed their labour mobility and introduced a large number of rit-based payment systems based on individual performance evaluations (about 40%) or have moved to a more complex type of human resource management scheme that integrates both seniority and merit elements (about 40%)' (p. 26).
Although large companies have increa nonregular workers to their production lines, they seem nonetheless to maintain long-term employment. Indeed, some companies are 'starting to move some nonregular workers into regular positions. UNIQLO, for example, a clothes retailer, said in March that it would turn 5,000 of its 6,000 nonregular workers into regular ones within two years, and Canon said it would do the same for 1,000 of its 13,000 factory workers' (1 December 2007, The Economist, p. 13).
As a result, the current labour mobility situation bears the following characteristics 31 : the number of any other model, as seen in Table   11 . Table 11 th of service in developed countries (%)
Germany France UK USA of regularly employed workers on 1 January 2006 was 43,606,000, and increased employees during 2006 comprised 8,332,500 (19.1%) of the total; they include transfers within the same enterprise
(1,339,600, 3.1% of the total) and newly hired employees (6,992,900, 16.0% of the total 32 ).
Occupationally experienced workers were included (4,535,100) in the total number of transfers. The net labour mobility of employees can be considered 10.4%; on the other hand, 8,445,900 (19.4% of the total) were decreased employees in 2006. They include transfers within the same enterprise
(1,401,000, 3.2%) and separated employees (7,044,900, 16.2%). Contract workers not protected by official laws officially became 'irregularly employed workers'.
The length of service in the typical J firm is longer than that
Once a male worker is employed by a large company, he tends not to move to another company; instead, he is transferred within the company. As Tables 12 and 13 show, changes in employment do not seem to cause significant changes in length of service. While nonregular workers have increased in number, core workers have increased their duration at their respective firms. The Japanese employment system can be maintained by curbing the number of newcomers.
Leng
The length of service Japan Median of length (years) 10.1 9.5 7.9 5.3 3.5
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 1993.
According to the 2003 report entitled 'Survey on the Corporate System and Employment', del time employment, the core of employees covered ivered by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), a continued commitment to lifetime employment can be observed in over 80% of Japanese firms (Jackson, 2007, p. 285 ).
However, as Jackson and Miyajima (2007) sonnel policy, the internal turnover of managers can be considered an appropriate focus of analysis 34 . Insiders promote not only specialised managers, but also core managers such as CEOs.
Since 1955, the J firm has shown the trend of a greater amount of managerial turnover among insiders 35 . Needless to say, job promotions do not suggest a lack of competition, given that 33 See Dore, 2006 . This term is used for a comparison with shareholder firms. Dore (2007) uses the term 'insider -WWII Japanese firms, s were supplied by the company (i.e., they were insiders) management'. In a 'quasi-community firm', employees play a main role in the company, and managers are also integrated with the employees. Therefore, an increase in managers' wages correlates with an increase in employees' wages. Employees work together with managers and institutionalise an awareness of equality. 34 See Miyajima and Kawamoto, 2007 . This survey mainly clarifies managerial turnover in pre which is quite different from that of the post-WWII era. 35 After the 1973 oil shock, 85% of managers in J firm employees compete amongst themselves to achieve a higher rank. In short, the internal managers market has functioned effectively in J firms.
According to some empirical data, the Japanese system requires a sufficient number of managers, performance has increased replacements and managerial turnover among insiders since the 1990s (Miyajima, 2005, p. 213) . As a result, a dual-case scenario has emerged since the collapse of the (Miyajima, 2005, p. 195) . 36 Toyota enlarged its number of board members to 58, which means that it requires another informal organisation for effective decision-making. In 1996, about 15% of all male employees in the 55-59 age bracket held an official 'manager' position (Dore, 2006 (Table 15) . Japanese corporations continue to use traditional employment adjustments (e.g., reductions in new hiring), even as they make good use of irregularly employed workers to adjust to crisis conditions. Clearly, such a hybrid approach has functioned well.
Between change and continuity
J model. The typical driving force for ha considered legislative. In fact, executive officers and executive committees are introduced in corporate law; legally, governance and management are distinguished. The common market-oriented changes are thus confirmed: an increase of outsiders and foreigners in corporate ownership and in the development of the stock market, the introduction of a merit system, an increase in the number of irregularly employed workers, a reduction of service tenure (as particularly manifested in unstable job-changing among members of the younger generation) and an increase in the number of outsider managers. These changes can be considered global phenomena, and the Japanese economic system may simply be aligning with the global model.
Nonetheless, J firms have not completely lost their own unique characteristics; as discussed, hybridisation has been observed. From this view type shareholder capitalist model. In differentiating these two models, the following dimensions, among others, must remain in focus: insider ownership and management, enterprises' welfare provisions, insider boards and internal labour markets. In short, the Japanese economic system has shown both change and continuity, and few Japanese firms have completely adopted the US model.
In any case, labour systems in Japanese firms have become a key survival factor.
The nature of said change and continuity determines the hybridisation patterns. The patterns are characterised by corporate ownership and two sets of internal labour systems rela boards. According to Jackson and Miyajima (2007) , Japanese firms fall into three broad groups, based on a cluster analysis (Figure 4) : the traditional Japanese model, with strong relational elements on all dimensions (42% of surveyed firms, accounting for 16% of total employment); hybrid firms, based on market-oriented finance and ownership characteristics (24% of surveyed firms, accounting for 67% of total employment); and an intermediate group (inverse hybrid) that has relational finance or insider boards with more market-oriented employment and incentive patterns (34% of surveyed firms, accounting for 18% of total employment).
In the process of examining one of several changes among J firms, it was found that 58% have already changed into a quasi-US model. However and management, two-thirds of those surveyed seem to have retained the characteristics of a J firm.
Inasmuch as the Japanese workplace characteristic of lifetime employment has been somewhat maintained, few have abandoned lifetime employment norms; on this front, hybridisation in a diversity of ways can be regarded a result of Japanese liberalisation. In this case, 1997 represents the turning point when a number of important legal relaxations were introduced, and 'in 2006, the process of change in corporate governance would appear to be reaching a point of culmination' (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007, p. 42) . The J firm model can, more or less, be considered stagnant 37 .
Outsider board Insider board The hybridisa h-dependent institutions and institutional complementarities have functioned in a diversity of ways. Indeed, the mechanisms of internal governance-as based on labour systems and employment-will continue to be fundamental in classifying a firm.
C
The Japanese thereafter. Although the Japanese economy has the traditional image of being an export-oriented economy, the adjustment process during that period brought about a heavy export-based orientation.
In exchange for low-level economic growth, Japan has accumulated budget deficits and found a key to settling bad loans. However, its level of economic recovery is in line with the presence of a global Japan's rich experiences in settling bad loans have not sufficiently provided useful lessons not only to Japan, but also to the global economy at large. In any case, Japan cannot yet allow itself to be roused by a 'false dawn' of economic recovery.
In Japan, the crisis became more serious as a result of ensuing liberalisation measures. Although exports have shown signs of economic recovery and some large businesses have recovered conomy. The evol current state of global meg somewhat, recovery cannot be considered genuine and the so-called 'false dawn' appears to be continuing. The following points are of special concern: 1) Incomes and consumption cannot be sufficiently restored, and many corporations have experienced the 'vicious circle' of cost cuts and wage declines, leading to a shortage of domestic demand. It is difficult to emerge from this proverbial rut.
2) The recovery of the international market has been insufficient. Given Japan's heavy reliance on exports, economic recovery to date has been limited.
3) The Japanese economic system is under reform, and the crisis does not dictate a stable and perspective model.
From the viewpoint of a variety of capitalism-based perspectives, the Japanese economic system is still in a state of dynamic transition, as a sort of coordinated market e ution of the Japanese economic system has meant that liberalisation permeates all aspects of the system. Particularly, corporate governance and the labour market (employment) are characteristic of the Japanese economic system, because long-term relations fostered by cross-shareholding, the main banking system and lifetime employment lie at the heart of core institutions.
The Japanese economic system has been liberalised, and a sharp increase in the number of irregularly employed workers may be considered a typical response. The a-competition obliges Japan to increase its productivity and strengthen its competitiveness. As a result, the economic system has increasingly become a hybrid of the status quo and the US model.
Japan's economic system has maintained its fundamental characteristics, owing to its culture of solid skill formation and specificity of the labour market (i.e., incentive mechanisms). At the very least, corporate governance in Japan consists of both change and continuity in its institutions, and the emerging diversity explains the sustainability and flexibility of its corporate institutions.
